Our Tactical Operations Center at FSB Mace, received an urgent radio call one night, and we discovered that one of our units had come into contact with a large enemy force and needed immediate air support.
With our Huey already preflighted and full of fuel and ammo, we took off and flew to a mountainous area just north north west of Phan Thiet and made radio contact with our guys on the ground. In a very short period of time, Wollman located them and headed to the south end of a canyon that was surrounded on two sides by the mountains that were common place in that part of the Southern Central Highlands. (It wasn't far from the battle field I earlier described where Wollman more or less stopped the Huey so the Colonel could command the battle field and we would be out of artillery lines of fire).
Unfortunately for us, at the south end of the canyon, there was another mountain that made it impossible to maintain a constant altitude and gun run at low level. If we did, we would have crashed into the southern most mountain. This further complicated the situation because we had not yet located the exact location of our troops. To add difficulty to that situation, it was pitch dark and our guys were in very close combat with the NVA/VC. To worsen the situation, the whole damn thing was going down very close to the point where all three of the mountain peaks intersected with one another.
About that time, we saw a USAF C 47, "Puff the Magic Dragon", approaching the firefight from a higher altitude, flying east to west over the area. We exchanged radio communications with them and a decision was made regarding who was best suited to take the primary role of air support. They couldn't get to an altitude as low as we were because of the mountains and, because they couldn't identify the exact position of our men, Wollman took the lead and had them stand by.
We were asked to fly down the canyon and shoot some marking rounds with the M 60's. This was done to insure that we were hitting the exact area that our men needed the fire and that no friendly fire casualties would exist.
I'd never seen any of the Aircraft Commanders order the crew to point their weapons forward, hold them steady and on his command, shoot a one second burst. This allowed Wollman to direct the bullets to the target area that he'd been given by the ground commander. He did that and was told by the ground commander that he'd hit the target and "pour it on". At that time, the gunners knew where the target area was but we were running out of space because the mountain at the end of the canyon was fast approaching.
In any event, we made a couple of effective gun runs and the guys on the ground reported that we needed to keep it coming. By the time all this unfolded, we began to run low on fuel and ammo and reported that we would make the short flight to Phan Thiet to resupply.
We did that, returned to the fight and continued to supply the effective gun runs that our guys needed. It seemed that no time had passed when we were again needing to fly back to Phan Thiet for more ammo and fuel. When we advised the ground commander that we were going to get more fuel and ammo, he advised us that they were running low on ammo and needed us to pick up a number of things at Phat Thiet.
Wollman must have radio'd the crew at Phan Thiet and told them we were coming in and needed a quick turn around including the resupply of ammo for the ground troops. When we landed at re-supply, I noticed a couple of enlisted men dragging the heavy ammo boxes that contained everything from M 60 and M 16 ammunition to hand grenades and M 70 rounds.
Wollman had been flying all night long and I, as a newbie co pilot, was pretty much involved with observations and cross checks on the instrument panel. I think he let me fly from Phan Thiet back to an area close the ingress point of our previous gun runs so he could stretch his legs and crack his fingers.
In any event, he took the controls again and began what I thought would be another gun run. I was wrong on that assumption because he was constantly on the radio with the ground commander and was slowing down instead of speeding up.
In a very short period of time, he brought the helicopter to a stop as the men below had directed us to a point where we could be certain that they would get the ammo and not the enemy. When they told us to stop and drop the ammo, I turned my head and watched the ammo boxes being shoved out of the Huey. I followed them as they fell through the tree tops and was more than a little relieved to hear the radio call that the drop was perfect.
By the time all these things transpired, we, and the guys on the ground, must have killed enough of the bad guys to turn the tide of battle as the ground commander seemed to think that they were going to be okay. Shortly thereafter, we left the area and began our flight home as we had been flying and fighting all night long. I don't remember if there was another Huey on station to take our place but I do remember that I felt lucky to be alive after experiencing a night mission that ended up being the longest combat assault I'd ever made at night during my entire tour.
I'm almost certain that I flew the ship back to FSB Mace as Wollman had been doing 99% of the flying that night. When we got to Mace the sun was coming up and we stopped long enough to make our report, take a break and eat breakfast. We were released and told to fly back to Long Binh and get some rest, which we gladly did.
When we landed, Major Stiner was waiting on us and had us stand in formation for an awards and decoration ceremony. I received my Bronze Star that morning and even though it wasn't for that particular fight, I was extremely proud to receive it as it is not an award for aircrew members. I simply assumed it was for my conduct during a couple of rocket and mortar attacks we experienced at Mace or one of the fire bases while I was there.
I remember that the Major knew all about the night long mission we'd just completed and was real happy to hear him acknowledge that and release us for some well deserved showers and sleep.
Of all the regrets I have from Vietnam, this particular mission stands at the top. I don't regret the experience of having seen that much combat in so small a time frame. On the other hand, I am quite appreciative of the tactical lessons I was privileged to see Wollman deliver that night. Despite that, I do regret that I didn't know anything at all about Awards and Decorations and through my ignorance, did not recommend him for the Distinguished Flying Cross. I have regretted that for forty years. In the past two years, I've communicated with a Colonel about that but was told it was beyond his control and that too many years had passed. I still regret that.
For whatever it is worth to all of you, last November, I commissioned an artist to make "A Copilot's Distinguished Flying Cross" to send to Craig for his military keep sakes. I thought I could send it by Christmas but here I am in May still waiting. Oh well, what can a guy with half a brain say?
This will conclude the posts regarding my combat experiences from my days with Fireball Aviation and the 199th Light Infantry Brigade. I haven't mentioned all the guys and simply think that I lack the words or skills to express those things so this will have to do for all. Special thanks to Craig Wollman, the greatest night combat pilot I ever knew. Thanks also to Dudley, Terry, Ed, JJ, Bob, Cpt. Moore, Kat Ballew and the many incredible gunners and crew chiefs we had the good fortune to have as our crews.
Next, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Air Cav Troop and the invasion of Cambodia.
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Monday, April 30, 2012
Sunday, April 29, 2012
Next to last combat mission 199th
Since this is the next to the last combat mission I intend to post, I want to make a statement and then issue a warning. The statement surrounds the fact that I am the only one still alive that witnessed this so I can't offend any individual. Next, if you have weak stomach, stop now.
One morning, we received an order to provide air cover for one of our fire bases as it was undergoing a ground attack by Viet Cong. We loaded up and flew to the fire base as fast as possible. When we arrived, we'd learned that the base had been penetrated by the VC but they had been killed and the rest of the attacking VC were retreating back to the jungle with a LRRP team hot on their heals.
We landed inside the base perimeter and shut down the Huey. I noticed 3 VC prisoners who had been tied up and were under guard by several of the men who had fought the battle. I also noticed a VC body that had made it to the wire surrounding the camp but had been killed just as he was preparing to cross the wire.
It was a ghastly sight. He'd been hit cross ways with what appeared to be a 50 caliber round because the front of his body had been opened from right to left and his entrails had fallen out of his body and were completely exposed. It was the only bullet hole I found but it was one huge opening that included the entire front of his body. It was almost as if a surgeon had taken a scalpel and opened him from side to side. I experienced / witnessed another 50 caliber wound later in my tour but I'll save that for part of the experiences I had with the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.
I also noticed that the 3 VC prisoners were not wearing blindfolds. Their hands were tied behind their backs and had no chance of escaping but they were placed in a manner where they had to look at their dead comrade. When I inspected the dead VC I noticed that he'd shit in his pants and with the smell of all that, I backed away from the area and was told to stand inside a mortar pit and observe the mortars that were going to be fired as the LRRP team had located the retreating VC and were preparing to attack.
As they began to shoot the mortar rounds, I was told to hold my ears and watch the rounds as they left the tube, flew skyward to the apex of it's flight and then dropped to the impact point. I'd never seen that before and was quite surprised to see and know that you could watch the round from it's firing point until it blew up when it hit the jungle.
I was also able to watch the small adjustments that could be made when the LRRPs adjusted the impact points after the first round hit. After a couple of adjustments, it was clear that they had received an order to fire at will. The mortar team was shooting as fast as the mortars could be dropped down the tube. It was impressive to be that close to the fight and watch it all unfold from a relative point of safety.
We were told to load up and as I walked toward the Huey I began to make a head count of the men making their way to the helicopter. We brought an interpreter with us and with the 3 VC prisoners, that made 4. We had our gunner and crew chief as well as a Command Sgt. Major and a high ranking officer from Brigade so that made 4 more. Adding me and the other pilot, we now would be flying back to home base with a total of ten men on board. I had already flown with 9 men on board and had covered that in an earlier post where we picked up the LRRP team that "whispered" when we communicated with them just before extracting them from their LZ. If you read that, you will recall the "smell" I described.
I don't know how long the VC had been in the jungle without any bath but I do know they smelled like a combination of a dead fish and a football locker room. In any event, the were seated on the extreme right hand side of the Huey with their feet and legs hanging out of the side of the helicopter. We were told to proceed to a rail road track that used to be a main artery to that part of the country and to fly high speed and low level which we did.
I could hear the interpreter yelling at the VC one by one and after a few minutes of that, we were told to climb to 1,500 feet and fly back to base. As soon as we arrived at our cruising altitude, I turned around to take a look at the prisoners to see what the first time helicopter riders were experiencing. Their eyes were wide open and as the interpreter was putting blind folds on them, it was clear that they were scared to pieces.
As the interpreter continued to yell at them, we were told two things. First, we were told that the interpreter was demanding that the VC give them the location of the unit they belonged to and where they were from. The second thing had to do with our final approach to base. We were told to stop at a 3 foot hover and not to put the ship on the ground.
When we confirmed the order, we were told to start slowing down to reduce the wind flow inside the aircraft and to slowly reach a temperature that might be closer to the one they had experienced and seen when we were flying fast and low over the rail road tracks. We complied with the order and made our approach but stopped at a 3' hover as expected.
I noticed a number of men waiting for us as we made our approach and that each of them were carrying M 16s. For those of you who have never stood close to a Huey when it's at a hover, let me say that it is loud. Above all the noise, even with our helmets on, we heard the incessant screams of the interpreter as he continued to ask them, one by one, where their unit was. When he asked the last man in the line of 3 where their unit was and he refused to tell him what he wanted, he went back to the VC in the middle and asked him. When he didn't respond, the interpreter kicked him out of the ship. He thought he was flying high over the tracks and his scream was heard by all. Even though he only fell 36" or so, the other two VC immediately began to talk and the interpreter was told everything he wanted to know.
As horrible as that may sound, in reality, it was more like jumping off your kitchen table than anything else. The VC that took the dive was not injured at all except for a level of being freaked out like a dope head on a bad acid trip. He didn't even need a band aid.
Having said and experienced all this, you may well imagine how happy I was to know that we had obtained the location of the VC that made the attack on our base as well as the village where other VC were located. You may also imagine what my thoughts are about the water boarding incidents that took place at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. I could have solved that issue with a small ride in Timmy's helicopter.
One more post to go before I leave the 199th when they go home. Stand by, the best one I've saved until last.
.
One morning, we received an order to provide air cover for one of our fire bases as it was undergoing a ground attack by Viet Cong. We loaded up and flew to the fire base as fast as possible. When we arrived, we'd learned that the base had been penetrated by the VC but they had been killed and the rest of the attacking VC were retreating back to the jungle with a LRRP team hot on their heals.
We landed inside the base perimeter and shut down the Huey. I noticed 3 VC prisoners who had been tied up and were under guard by several of the men who had fought the battle. I also noticed a VC body that had made it to the wire surrounding the camp but had been killed just as he was preparing to cross the wire.
It was a ghastly sight. He'd been hit cross ways with what appeared to be a 50 caliber round because the front of his body had been opened from right to left and his entrails had fallen out of his body and were completely exposed. It was the only bullet hole I found but it was one huge opening that included the entire front of his body. It was almost as if a surgeon had taken a scalpel and opened him from side to side. I experienced / witnessed another 50 caliber wound later in my tour but I'll save that for part of the experiences I had with the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.
I also noticed that the 3 VC prisoners were not wearing blindfolds. Their hands were tied behind their backs and had no chance of escaping but they were placed in a manner where they had to look at their dead comrade. When I inspected the dead VC I noticed that he'd shit in his pants and with the smell of all that, I backed away from the area and was told to stand inside a mortar pit and observe the mortars that were going to be fired as the LRRP team had located the retreating VC and were preparing to attack.
As they began to shoot the mortar rounds, I was told to hold my ears and watch the rounds as they left the tube, flew skyward to the apex of it's flight and then dropped to the impact point. I'd never seen that before and was quite surprised to see and know that you could watch the round from it's firing point until it blew up when it hit the jungle.
I was also able to watch the small adjustments that could be made when the LRRPs adjusted the impact points after the first round hit. After a couple of adjustments, it was clear that they had received an order to fire at will. The mortar team was shooting as fast as the mortars could be dropped down the tube. It was impressive to be that close to the fight and watch it all unfold from a relative point of safety.
We were told to load up and as I walked toward the Huey I began to make a head count of the men making their way to the helicopter. We brought an interpreter with us and with the 3 VC prisoners, that made 4. We had our gunner and crew chief as well as a Command Sgt. Major and a high ranking officer from Brigade so that made 4 more. Adding me and the other pilot, we now would be flying back to home base with a total of ten men on board. I had already flown with 9 men on board and had covered that in an earlier post where we picked up the LRRP team that "whispered" when we communicated with them just before extracting them from their LZ. If you read that, you will recall the "smell" I described.
I don't know how long the VC had been in the jungle without any bath but I do know they smelled like a combination of a dead fish and a football locker room. In any event, the were seated on the extreme right hand side of the Huey with their feet and legs hanging out of the side of the helicopter. We were told to proceed to a rail road track that used to be a main artery to that part of the country and to fly high speed and low level which we did.
I could hear the interpreter yelling at the VC one by one and after a few minutes of that, we were told to climb to 1,500 feet and fly back to base. As soon as we arrived at our cruising altitude, I turned around to take a look at the prisoners to see what the first time helicopter riders were experiencing. Their eyes were wide open and as the interpreter was putting blind folds on them, it was clear that they were scared to pieces.
As the interpreter continued to yell at them, we were told two things. First, we were told that the interpreter was demanding that the VC give them the location of the unit they belonged to and where they were from. The second thing had to do with our final approach to base. We were told to stop at a 3 foot hover and not to put the ship on the ground.
When we confirmed the order, we were told to start slowing down to reduce the wind flow inside the aircraft and to slowly reach a temperature that might be closer to the one they had experienced and seen when we were flying fast and low over the rail road tracks. We complied with the order and made our approach but stopped at a 3' hover as expected.
I noticed a number of men waiting for us as we made our approach and that each of them were carrying M 16s. For those of you who have never stood close to a Huey when it's at a hover, let me say that it is loud. Above all the noise, even with our helmets on, we heard the incessant screams of the interpreter as he continued to ask them, one by one, where their unit was. When he asked the last man in the line of 3 where their unit was and he refused to tell him what he wanted, he went back to the VC in the middle and asked him. When he didn't respond, the interpreter kicked him out of the ship. He thought he was flying high over the tracks and his scream was heard by all. Even though he only fell 36" or so, the other two VC immediately began to talk and the interpreter was told everything he wanted to know.
As horrible as that may sound, in reality, it was more like jumping off your kitchen table than anything else. The VC that took the dive was not injured at all except for a level of being freaked out like a dope head on a bad acid trip. He didn't even need a band aid.
Having said and experienced all this, you may well imagine how happy I was to know that we had obtained the location of the VC that made the attack on our base as well as the village where other VC were located. You may also imagine what my thoughts are about the water boarding incidents that took place at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. I could have solved that issue with a small ride in Timmy's helicopter.
One more post to go before I leave the 199th when they go home. Stand by, the best one I've saved until last.
.
Friday, April 27, 2012
Long Binh to Tuy Hoa via Phan Thiet.
Major Lewis, the Kappa Alpha C.O. I referred to early on in these posts, received orders to transfer to Tuy Hoa and Major Stiner came in to take his place commanding the Fireball Aviation Section of the 199th. Normally that wouldn't be such a big deal but in this case it was. Not only was Major Stiner an incredible leader and perfect officer to take command of our section but he was a strategist as well, and one who had very insightful methods as it relates to combat operations.
Instead of catching a fixed wing aircraft to Tuy Hoa, a very long distance flight for a helicopter, he chose us to fly him there. I've often thought that he did that because he knew that most of the fixed wing flight would have been over the mountains and if anything at all went wrong, they would end up in the jungles or the mountains and have a most difficult time with rescue.
We left Long Binh very early one morning, picked up Major Lewis in Xuan Loc and began our long distance flight. Since I knew it wasn't going to be a hunter killer kind of mission, I brought a cassette player with me and recorded many parts of the flight.
We flew east to Phan Thiet where the coastline of Vietnam and the South China Sea met and then proceeded Northward for hour after hour. I remember seeing the "Phang Rang Pass" for the first time and recalled the many stories I'd heard about the battles that had taken place all over that area.
An Island that was just offshore had been the site of a huge battle between the Viet Cong and the Korean soldiers we had as our ally. It was famous to us as it was the first experience we had in learning about the "ears" that they had attached to their belts as proof of how many VC they had killed in combat.
It seemed that proof of killing had with it some kind of bonus for their infantry and one guy had ears hanging from his belt to the ground. They were tough as nails and showed no mercy when fighting the merciless and murderous Viet Cong.
Just as we prepared to stop for fuel we received a radio call warning us that we were flying through an artillery line where 125 or 155 mm Howitzers or 8" guns from offshore Navy cruisers were flying through the air.
It reminded me of my first combat mission with Wollman where he found a spot where we would be clear of the artillery lines and more or less, stopped the aircraft and brought it to a hover over the battle field. I can close my eyes and re run all of that through my memory. You may recall that I mentioned that it "wasn't in the tactics book" I had just finished studying at Ft. Rucker, and then, I realized that guys like Wollman were the ones that were writing the book.
I remember how beautiful Chamron Bay was (SP). I'd read about the U.S. Marine Corp coming ashore in amphibious assault boats there and imagined what that might have been like. In any event, we finally arrived at Tuy Hoa and said our goodbyes to Major Lewis. One hell of a good commander.
After refueling for the second time, we took off and headed south as we knew it was going to be an all day long flight that might well end up with us having a night landing if we didn't get a move on.
Nothing of any importance happened on the flight back to Long Binh except for the fact that I had experienced a number of "hot refuels" where we never shut down the helicopter's turbine. When we finally made it home, I remember filling out the log book and being surprised that we had booked nine or eleven hours of flight time that day. It was the most hours I had ever logged or would ever log in one day.
Thursday, April 26, 2012
Assassination Attempt targeting Bob Hope 1964
I hate to get "Off Topic" again but sometimes, you have to do that. Despite the fact that it takes me away from the "flow" of my memories of the combat missions I flew in Vietnam, today's circumstances require that I do so. Please bare with me and know that I will get back to the remainder of my stories from the days when I flew with the 199th Light Infantry Brigade.
As it specifically relates to the reason that I am off topic, know that I belong to a number of military organizations that have web sites where daily communications take place. Day before yesterday, one of them had an Editorial regarding Bob Hope and his incredible record of entertaining troops during his entire career. I wanted to post a reply to that Editorial but there are rules on that site that absolutely, positively forbid "Politicizing" the site.
In view of that, I wanted to respect the rules and respond to that Editorial here because my blog has a link there and they can read my response without any violations of the rules. For those of you who do not like or offended by political history, please disconnect now and do not read further.
As it relates to all of that and to substantiate the source documents, be advised that I read "A Soldier Reports" which is a book written by General Westmorland. I also read "LBJ" which is a book written from the reports of 400 of his staffers. During those reads, I learned alot of things including the content of messages sent from the LBJ White House and Macv Headquarters.
One of the things I learned had to do with an assassination attempt targeting Bob Hope. I lost the books and a number of other things during a tornado and will attempt to do this from memory only, and can not give you a chapter and verse of who said what or the exact day that each of the following events took place. Again, this is from memory only.
Despite not having those source documents at hand, sometime after the farce known as the "1964 Gulf of Tonkin Incident"of August 1964, Bob Hope was in Vietnam to entertain the troops. That was most probably in December of 64. While he was there, he was in the Brink's Hotel in Saigon. During that time, the Viet Cong decided to assassinate him. Fortunately for all of us, the attempt failed.
Around that time, McGeorge Bundy had a meeting with the General Grade Officers at Macv in Saigon. I think that McGeorge Bundy was the Secretary of State but he might have been the Secretary of Defense, I just can't remember. Regardless of his station in the government, he was the highest ranking representative of the Johnson White House in Vietnam during that meeting.
General Westmorland reported that Bundy went nuts when he found out about the assassination attempt. Westmorland, as he witnessed Bundy's reaction to the news, described him as the "Most Hitlerian Individual He'd Ever Met". Shortly thereafter, if you will recall, Bundy contacted the LBJ White House and the results ended up with an order to "call up the Reserves". That resulted in a troop concentration in Vietnam that went from 16,000 to a quarter of a million men.
It's real important to note that President Ky or Thieu, ordered an air strike against North Vietnam 48 hours prior to the fabrication of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. It is also important to know that the assassination attempt took place roughly 4 months later.
I would suggest that any of you who are that interested in the step by step events that took place during the early years of the Vietnam War, get the two books mentioned above and connect the dots yourself. It certainly opened my eyes and explained many of the orders we had, that to me, didn't make any sense at all.
Above all, please understand that I do not access any situation above and the resulting troop escalations, to be the fault of Bob Hope. I actually had the honor of flying low level recon missions around Long Binh when he came for Christmas in 1970. My specific orders were "shoot to kill" anybody carrying an AK 47 or wearing an NVA pith helmet. Nobody worth shooting showed up
Please excuse any misquoted dates.
.
Tuesday, April 24, 2012
This one has Wollman's name all over it.
Wollman wasn't a teacher, he was an educator and there is one hell of a difference between the two. On the night that the Lt. Col came to meet with our CO, the weather at FSB Mace was okay. Despite that, as we were attempting our taxi flight to return the LC back to Long Binh, I discovered what a night monsoon mission was like.
Once we were airborne remember seeing the monster just west of Xuan Loc, close to Long Binh and was amazed at the size and scope of the monsoon every time the lightning lit up the sky and gave us a visual picture of what we were flying toward. I'm not sure if Wollman was testing me or teaching me but as soon as the lightning hit and the picture of our immediate future became clear, he said: "Contact Center and get us a vector out of here".
I looked up the frequency, dialed in the numbers and immediately heard the non stop radio traffic from every aircraft in that part of South Vietnam that was trying to escape the storm. Finally, I found a break and made my call: "Center, this is Fireball 558". They responded and I requested a vector to any station that was still VFR. They asked us to tune our transponder to 1200 and "ident". We did that and as soon as we did, we heard: "Roger, Fireball 558, contact 6 clicks west of Xuan Loc, turn left to a heading of 180 degrees and proceed south. Bear Cat is open". I responded with my own "Roger, Fireball 558" and turned south.
I don't remember how long it would take to fly to Bear Cat as I had never been there and simply didn't know. As we continued to fly along, the non stop radio calls to Center were beginning to indicate that there were lots and lots of fixed wing and rotary wing pilots trying to escape the monsoon. Center called and advised us to contact Bear Cat Approach Control, gave us the frequency and signed off.
Bear Cat Approach Control was overflowing with radio calls but I found a break and made my contact with them. As soon as I did that, they asked us to make a right turn for separation, a normal request to keep traffic from piling up and causing a mid air collision. As soon as I completed my 360 degree clearing turn, they called us and said: "Fireball 558, state final approach speed". This was the first of 3 or 4 calls they made to us to confirm our final approach speed. I told them 120 knots and they asked us to slow to 100 knots and make another 360 degree clearing turn to the right.
We finally reached a point where we could see the lights from Bear Cat but we noticed that there were so many airborne lights from helicopters and fixed wing aircraft trying to land, we became a bit concerned as we were running very low on fuel. The airspace around and above Bear Cat looked like some kind of Christmas show. I don't have any idea how many aircraft were seeking shelter from the monsoon but I knew it was the most I had ever seen at one spot, at one time.
With yet another request for a clearing turn and a slower approach speed, I guess I lost my patience. I remember responding with something to the effect that "If you will let us intersect the Locator Outer Marker, I will stop completely and hover down to tree top level and give you all the clearance you need".
I don't know if Wollman was testing me for a possible aircraft commander check ride, or to simply see how I would handle that kind of situation. Regardless of any reason, he had me make all the radio calls and do all the flying and even though it was a shitty situation, he seemed as calm as a guy taking his favorite girl for a nice, easy flight during night time. I would later learn that he was just as calm during the longest Nighthawk Mission he and I ever flew together. We could have called him Ice Man because he was just that brave or just that calm under real tight situations.
In any event, the pucker factor went up right after I made my last clearing turn for separation. Of all things, the 20 minute fuel warning light came on. We were only a couple of minutes away from the airfield but Wollman made one of those decisions that only an aircraft commander can make. He turned his radio switch to transmit and informed approach control that we had a 20 minute fuel warning light on and he WAS coming "straight in".
There was no doubt about his intention and with the inflection of his voice, I'm sure that every airplane in the circuit understood that he didn't really give a shit who was first, who was fastest or any separation issues that might continue to exist. Needless to say, we made a straight in approach and hovered directly to the refueling area with the bright yellow 20 minute fuel warning light blaring from the cockpit as it had been doing for way too many minutes.
We made a successful landing, fueled up and hovered to a revetment area where we shut down the helicopter. May not sound like much of a war story but again, there are all sorts of battles that helicopter pilots had during the war and many of them were just like this one when the monsoons came. Thanks to Wollman for being such a great aircraft commander and having the guts to give total control of the Huey to a copilot to see how he could handle those kinds of situations. Without a doubt, those lessons served me well during many Nighthawk Missions I later flew with the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Thanks to Craig Wollman, the pilot I consider to be the best night combat ops pilot I ever flew with.
.
Once we were airborne remember seeing the monster just west of Xuan Loc, close to Long Binh and was amazed at the size and scope of the monsoon every time the lightning lit up the sky and gave us a visual picture of what we were flying toward. I'm not sure if Wollman was testing me or teaching me but as soon as the lightning hit and the picture of our immediate future became clear, he said: "Contact Center and get us a vector out of here".
I looked up the frequency, dialed in the numbers and immediately heard the non stop radio traffic from every aircraft in that part of South Vietnam that was trying to escape the storm. Finally, I found a break and made my call: "Center, this is Fireball 558". They responded and I requested a vector to any station that was still VFR. They asked us to tune our transponder to 1200 and "ident". We did that and as soon as we did, we heard: "Roger, Fireball 558, contact 6 clicks west of Xuan Loc, turn left to a heading of 180 degrees and proceed south. Bear Cat is open". I responded with my own "Roger, Fireball 558" and turned south.
I don't remember how long it would take to fly to Bear Cat as I had never been there and simply didn't know. As we continued to fly along, the non stop radio calls to Center were beginning to indicate that there were lots and lots of fixed wing and rotary wing pilots trying to escape the monsoon. Center called and advised us to contact Bear Cat Approach Control, gave us the frequency and signed off.
Bear Cat Approach Control was overflowing with radio calls but I found a break and made my contact with them. As soon as I did that, they asked us to make a right turn for separation, a normal request to keep traffic from piling up and causing a mid air collision. As soon as I completed my 360 degree clearing turn, they called us and said: "Fireball 558, state final approach speed". This was the first of 3 or 4 calls they made to us to confirm our final approach speed. I told them 120 knots and they asked us to slow to 100 knots and make another 360 degree clearing turn to the right.
We finally reached a point where we could see the lights from Bear Cat but we noticed that there were so many airborne lights from helicopters and fixed wing aircraft trying to land, we became a bit concerned as we were running very low on fuel. The airspace around and above Bear Cat looked like some kind of Christmas show. I don't have any idea how many aircraft were seeking shelter from the monsoon but I knew it was the most I had ever seen at one spot, at one time.
With yet another request for a clearing turn and a slower approach speed, I guess I lost my patience. I remember responding with something to the effect that "If you will let us intersect the Locator Outer Marker, I will stop completely and hover down to tree top level and give you all the clearance you need".
I don't know if Wollman was testing me for a possible aircraft commander check ride, or to simply see how I would handle that kind of situation. Regardless of any reason, he had me make all the radio calls and do all the flying and even though it was a shitty situation, he seemed as calm as a guy taking his favorite girl for a nice, easy flight during night time. I would later learn that he was just as calm during the longest Nighthawk Mission he and I ever flew together. We could have called him Ice Man because he was just that brave or just that calm under real tight situations.
In any event, the pucker factor went up right after I made my last clearing turn for separation. Of all things, the 20 minute fuel warning light came on. We were only a couple of minutes away from the airfield but Wollman made one of those decisions that only an aircraft commander can make. He turned his radio switch to transmit and informed approach control that we had a 20 minute fuel warning light on and he WAS coming "straight in".
There was no doubt about his intention and with the inflection of his voice, I'm sure that every airplane in the circuit understood that he didn't really give a shit who was first, who was fastest or any separation issues that might continue to exist. Needless to say, we made a straight in approach and hovered directly to the refueling area with the bright yellow 20 minute fuel warning light blaring from the cockpit as it had been doing for way too many minutes.
We made a successful landing, fueled up and hovered to a revetment area where we shut down the helicopter. May not sound like much of a war story but again, there are all sorts of battles that helicopter pilots had during the war and many of them were just like this one when the monsoons came. Thanks to Wollman for being such a great aircraft commander and having the guts to give total control of the Huey to a copilot to see how he could handle those kinds of situations. Without a doubt, those lessons served me well during many Nighthawk Missions I later flew with the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Thanks to Craig Wollman, the pilot I consider to be the best night combat ops pilot I ever flew with.
.
Wednesday, April 18, 2012
"Take it, take it, I have Vertigo"
One night that was filled with bad weather, Terry Femmer and I took off from Fire Support Base Mace and attempted to make the flight back to Long Binh. The weather wasn't rainy or anything like that but typically, after an unusually heavy rain from the monsoons, with the temperature reaching over 100 degrees during the day, we would suffer from the fog that always comes after a weather condition like that.
If there ever was a day when Diable's repeated "Attention to Detail" mantra hit home, this was it.
I don't remember who the gunner was but I most clearly remember that the crew chief was Spec 4 Moses Richardson from Indianapolis. Mose use to say that he was the Black Mose from Nap Town and he was one cool crew chief that made his value to us known on many occasions. I'll have to get into that later but suffice it to say he considered us to be his Blue Eyed Soul Brothers. I've lost contact with him and even the net hasn't helped find him.
In any event, if I haven't explained it before, FSB Mace was located at the foot of a mountain that was just east of Xuan Loc, an area that has it's place in history as one of the most hotly contested areas in our Area of Operations. The FSB had a helipad area there that even had lights for us to see during inclement weather conditions. They were seldom on but when we needed them, there they were helping us find our way through the weather to a safe landing after a night mission.
When Femmer took off, we were heading east. Almost immediately after take off, he made a right hand climbing turn to gain the altitude we needed to clear the mountain. It seems that no sooner than we picked up a westerly heading, Femmer came on the intercom and said: "Take it, take it, I have vertigo".
Having made a couple of IFR flights with Wollman, I was pretty comfortable in that environment and had already settled down to the instrument scans that any decent co pilot would do for his Aircraft Commander. At the time Femmer told me to take the controls, I still had, through my peripheral vision, a good sight picture of the helipad with it's landing lights on.
Almost immediately after Femmer's comment for me to take it, I heard Mose over the intercom. He said: "Please, one of you guys do some of that pilot stuff". I had already grabbed the controls of the Huey and began a shallow bank to the right away from the mountain and, at the same time I said: "Guys, I have the helipad still in sight and I'm making a right base to final approach back to the pad, don't worry, I've got it in sight".
I told Femmer to put his feet on the floor and shake it off and not to worry that I was VFR which was our term for visual flight rules that allowed me to see exactly where I intended to land and the attitude of the helicopter. I just wanted everybody to know that the aircraft was under control and we would be back on the ground in about one minute.
That may not seem like much of a war story for you but I assure you that the monsoon season brought on some really tough flying conditions and I'm sure that we lost many aircraft due to those incredibly difficult flying situations.
More to come later. I'm feeling a little better now. I have another Wollman story coming so please stand by. I'm still a bit fatigued from all the meltdowns and the lower back pain that always comes from the kidneys when dye is injected into your body during a Catscan.
Rest in Peace, Terry Femmer. A great Aircraft Commander and true patriot.
If there ever was a day when Diable's repeated "Attention to Detail" mantra hit home, this was it.
I don't remember who the gunner was but I most clearly remember that the crew chief was Spec 4 Moses Richardson from Indianapolis. Mose use to say that he was the Black Mose from Nap Town and he was one cool crew chief that made his value to us known on many occasions. I'll have to get into that later but suffice it to say he considered us to be his Blue Eyed Soul Brothers. I've lost contact with him and even the net hasn't helped find him.
In any event, if I haven't explained it before, FSB Mace was located at the foot of a mountain that was just east of Xuan Loc, an area that has it's place in history as one of the most hotly contested areas in our Area of Operations. The FSB had a helipad area there that even had lights for us to see during inclement weather conditions. They were seldom on but when we needed them, there they were helping us find our way through the weather to a safe landing after a night mission.
When Femmer took off, we were heading east. Almost immediately after take off, he made a right hand climbing turn to gain the altitude we needed to clear the mountain. It seems that no sooner than we picked up a westerly heading, Femmer came on the intercom and said: "Take it, take it, I have vertigo".
Having made a couple of IFR flights with Wollman, I was pretty comfortable in that environment and had already settled down to the instrument scans that any decent co pilot would do for his Aircraft Commander. At the time Femmer told me to take the controls, I still had, through my peripheral vision, a good sight picture of the helipad with it's landing lights on.
Almost immediately after Femmer's comment for me to take it, I heard Mose over the intercom. He said: "Please, one of you guys do some of that pilot stuff". I had already grabbed the controls of the Huey and began a shallow bank to the right away from the mountain and, at the same time I said: "Guys, I have the helipad still in sight and I'm making a right base to final approach back to the pad, don't worry, I've got it in sight".
I told Femmer to put his feet on the floor and shake it off and not to worry that I was VFR which was our term for visual flight rules that allowed me to see exactly where I intended to land and the attitude of the helicopter. I just wanted everybody to know that the aircraft was under control and we would be back on the ground in about one minute.
That may not seem like much of a war story for you but I assure you that the monsoon season brought on some really tough flying conditions and I'm sure that we lost many aircraft due to those incredibly difficult flying situations.
More to come later. I'm feeling a little better now. I have another Wollman story coming so please stand by. I'm still a bit fatigued from all the meltdowns and the lower back pain that always comes from the kidneys when dye is injected into your body during a Catscan.
Rest in Peace, Terry Femmer. A great Aircraft Commander and true patriot.
Monday, April 16, 2012
I think Meltdowns are over for a while
I haven't had a full blown meltdown in 48 hours. Maybe I am entering the 12 day period of no meltdowns. I hope so. Had a catscan today and am really tired but not so tired that I can't let you know that the stories are soon to come back.
Tim
Tim
Tuesday, April 10, 2012
Meltdowns are back
I've had a pretty tough time the last 4 days as the meltdowns are back. I can take all the meds they give me and despite that, I can't seem to control them even if I knock myself out.
I want everybody to know that I totally enjoy posting the memories that you've seen here and that, in no way, has anything to do with the meltdowns. You will see that I had few if any postings in 2011 and despite that, the meltdowns were horrendous. Sometimes I go 12 days without having them.
As I understand it, this will probably be a life long affliction and there is really nothing I can do about it. I have accepted that and am learning just to shut down when they come. Have a bit of patience and I will get on with more posting shortly. Thanks for understanding. Tim
I want everybody to know that I totally enjoy posting the memories that you've seen here and that, in no way, has anything to do with the meltdowns. You will see that I had few if any postings in 2011 and despite that, the meltdowns were horrendous. Sometimes I go 12 days without having them.
As I understand it, this will probably be a life long affliction and there is really nothing I can do about it. I have accepted that and am learning just to shut down when they come. Have a bit of patience and I will get on with more posting shortly. Thanks for understanding. Tim
Sunday, April 8, 2012
What do you mean, you killed a tree?
As luck would have it, I received an email from Craig in response to a question I sent regarding a most unusual Nighthawk mission I flew. I emailed him and asked if it was he and I that flew the Nighthawk over the log truck one night. He responded that he had reports of it being in a place it was not supposed to be and shot the truck to pieces one daylight mission.
Later that night, I pulled the duty of going back to the area for a typical Nighthawk mission. When we arrived at the location on the map given to us as the target area, we could clearly see the 18 wheeler that Craig had killed.
For some reason, I think it might have been Kat Ballew that had the position of Aircraft Commander that night but it could have been Terry Femmer. In any event, as we found the truck, I was amazed at the size of the logs on the back of the truck. Having spent some time with the Colossus Midland Belting Company delivering parts to sawmills, even I was amazed at the diameter of the tree. I'd never seen anything that large because it takes huge "Head Rigs" to saw up a monster tree like this one was. To my knowledge there weren't any head rigs with saws of the size that could take on a tree that was 6' in diameter.
In any event, we began a north to south gun run on the log truck and did so where the 50 caliber machine gun could be used as the primary weapon. I can't remember who was manning the gun but the 50 caliber rounds found their way into that monster sized tree. We didn't know it at the time but Wollman killed the truck and made sure it was going nowhere. We, on the other hand, were simply shooting every square inch of it.
Unknown to us was the fact that the NVA VC had hollowed out trees and used them to transport weapons across that area of Vietnam. We were all shocked when one of the 50 caliber bullets found it's mark inside that tree and hit the munitions it was carrying. There was an explosion that was something like an explosion you see when a Navy battleship shoots a huge artillery round into another ship and it lands in the powder magazine. When I tell you there was an explosion, I MEAN there was a huge, huge explosion as the RPGs, hand grenades, rockets and mortars blew up.
(To Ed) this was the same LZ where Finnerty and I picked up you and the other 3 Arps during the bullet filled fight we had there in November. I'll get to that story when I finish the 199th part of my tour.
At the end of that mission and with our return to base with the story, the word spread like crazy that we had killed a tree. We never would have been able to do it if Craig hadn't killed the truck but I will have to admit that it was a very exciting mission even if we were only cleaning up all the work that Craig had already done. We never received a single round of gunfire from the NVA that night and I was glad of it. Craig told me that there had been a report captured from the NVA VC that mentioned losing their ammo/supply truck. Way to go Wollman.
More Nighthawks coming so just stand by. Some are crazy and Im sure you will enjoy them.
Tim
Later that night, I pulled the duty of going back to the area for a typical Nighthawk mission. When we arrived at the location on the map given to us as the target area, we could clearly see the 18 wheeler that Craig had killed.
For some reason, I think it might have been Kat Ballew that had the position of Aircraft Commander that night but it could have been Terry Femmer. In any event, as we found the truck, I was amazed at the size of the logs on the back of the truck. Having spent some time with the Colossus Midland Belting Company delivering parts to sawmills, even I was amazed at the diameter of the tree. I'd never seen anything that large because it takes huge "Head Rigs" to saw up a monster tree like this one was. To my knowledge there weren't any head rigs with saws of the size that could take on a tree that was 6' in diameter.
In any event, we began a north to south gun run on the log truck and did so where the 50 caliber machine gun could be used as the primary weapon. I can't remember who was manning the gun but the 50 caliber rounds found their way into that monster sized tree. We didn't know it at the time but Wollman killed the truck and made sure it was going nowhere. We, on the other hand, were simply shooting every square inch of it.
Unknown to us was the fact that the NVA VC had hollowed out trees and used them to transport weapons across that area of Vietnam. We were all shocked when one of the 50 caliber bullets found it's mark inside that tree and hit the munitions it was carrying. There was an explosion that was something like an explosion you see when a Navy battleship shoots a huge artillery round into another ship and it lands in the powder magazine. When I tell you there was an explosion, I MEAN there was a huge, huge explosion as the RPGs, hand grenades, rockets and mortars blew up.
(To Ed) this was the same LZ where Finnerty and I picked up you and the other 3 Arps during the bullet filled fight we had there in November. I'll get to that story when I finish the 199th part of my tour.
At the end of that mission and with our return to base with the story, the word spread like crazy that we had killed a tree. We never would have been able to do it if Craig hadn't killed the truck but I will have to admit that it was a very exciting mission even if we were only cleaning up all the work that Craig had already done. We never received a single round of gunfire from the NVA that night and I was glad of it. Craig told me that there had been a report captured from the NVA VC that mentioned losing their ammo/supply truck. Way to go Wollman.
More Nighthawks coming so just stand by. Some are crazy and Im sure you will enjoy them.
Tim
Friday, April 6, 2012
Responses to Nighthawks
I had no idea I would have all the comments I've received regarding Nighthawk Missions. I guess that after all these years, it just becomes a part of you and you think it's a normal part of the war and with all the movies and documentaries that have been made, everybody knows about them. That's not the reality of it all and I've decided that I better go ahead and explain it now.
For the most part, there were two kinds of Nighthawk Missions. One was a direct result of a night time attack on any of our firebases or patrols that were deep in the jungles of Vietnam. Those were the best kind as they directly resulted in saving lives of our men wherever they might be.
Many of you may have seen Platoon and will recall the night the NVA attacked the firebase. It was so bad that the commander had to call an airstrike with instructions to drop the bombs "inside the perimeter of the base". That's as bad as it can get for the guys who were stuck there with no way out other than to kill your way out.
The other kind of Nighthawk Mission had more to do with "hunting" than responding to a known threat at a known location. Sometimes they didn't produce anything at all except for some very nervous periods of time for the crew.
At other times, we were lucky enough to see some enemy activity through the night vision equipment we had on board. It would show the hear/perspiration coming from the VC as they paddled a sampan down the canals at night. Sometimes it would even show the heat reflection as they took a leak at the edge of the jungle. In either event that's how we located the enemy at night if they weren't giving away their position through the muzzle flashes as they fired their AK 47s or the tracers that were coming from the same.
As I have continued with the article about my experiences with the 199th, something occurred to me that I hadn't thought about until I wondered about the various experiences my Aircraft Commanders had prior to my arrival in the unit.
We seldom talked about it in the unit but I knew that some of the pilots were heavily effected by the deaths of two men with the 199th. One was the Commanding General and the other was the pilot I replaced.
As I look back on that and thought about my own experiences with the next unit I flew with, I understood the difference it made when the Aircraft Commander was one who lost a close friend who was killed in action. I know that it made a huge difference in me but I don't want to get into that at this time. I'll get into it after I finish my posts regarding the pilots in the 199th.
I hope this answers some of the questions I've been asked about Wollman, Femmer and Young as well as the experiences they had prior to the time I became their co pilot.
I think I'm going to take a day off as I had a bummer of a night last night when I rec'd a comment about a post I made on another military site I am active in. I may explain that later but I don't want to get off topic too much at this time. It kept me up until 3 a.m. and I'm really bushed by it all. Thanks
Thursday, April 5, 2012
Short note about email from Craig Wollman
You McInnis girls are gonna love this, especially Risa.
Risa, right after you called and we discussed some things on the blog and how much you enjoyed hearing about Wollman and the little details like OAT, EGT etc, I received an email from Craig.
Craig was responding to an email I sent him about the mission I intend to post next. In that email, he confirmed a thing or two I wanted to know about the next mission but he added another note about the previous posts.
He told me that the report I described as OAT, EGT etc, was called a "DEAR" and it meant "Daily Engine Analysis Report". He also told me that they still use it today in commercial helicopter operations. I don't want to spoil the next combat mission so I won't add anything here at this time but I will say that I'm glad I correctly recalled the next mission and that it was Craig that was flying AC.
Stand by, more coming later. Tim
Risa, right after you called and we discussed some things on the blog and how much you enjoyed hearing about Wollman and the little details like OAT, EGT etc, I received an email from Craig.
Craig was responding to an email I sent him about the mission I intend to post next. In that email, he confirmed a thing or two I wanted to know about the next mission but he added another note about the previous posts.
He told me that the report I described as OAT, EGT etc, was called a "DEAR" and it meant "Daily Engine Analysis Report". He also told me that they still use it today in commercial helicopter operations. I don't want to spoil the next combat mission so I won't add anything here at this time but I will say that I'm glad I correctly recalled the next mission and that it was Craig that was flying AC.
Stand by, more coming later. Tim
Tuesday, April 3, 2012
Killed in Action on July 4th.
On July 4th, 1970, I witnessed one of the most shocking and horrible scenes that a helicopter pilot can witness. I was flying co pilot that day and Wollman was the Aircraft Commander. We were on standby at Mace as we had drawn the duty of flying the Colonel on one of his tours around the AO. The sense of having a day with no combat was always nice as we generally didn't run into trouble when the Colonel was on one of his inspection tours.
Any degree of calm was totally blown away when we received the word that one of our convoys was involved in an ambush and a huge fire fight was underway. We ran to the helicopter followed by the Colonel who was also running. The sight of the boss running toward the Huey wasn't exactly the kind of thing that inspires a laid back attitude. I had only been in Vietnam for six weeks and even though I'd had some combat time, this seemed to be a totally different atmosphere than the one you have when you are sitting in front of a map planning a mission for the next day.
The Colonel didn't explain the size and scope of the battle. He only said that there was an ambush not far away and that Wollman should "fly up the road". I remember that Wollman had the Huey up and running and did one of those military take offs that we knew was one that was only done when the situation was one of life and death.
I could see a couple of helicopters orbiting the area and I heard the Colonel tell Wollman to stay west of the road and make north south passes. I'd already witnessed that kind of holding pattern and I knew that the Colonel was aware of artillery shells being fired into the scene where the NVA were fighting from.
That holding pattern put the copilot's seat on the side of the helicopter closest to the firefight. It's like riding shot gun in a car when your driver turns in front of on coming traffic that's very close. Usually, a comment follows that kind of turn in a car where the passenger says something like: "Hey that's on MY side".
I could see a line of vehicles on the road with alot of men taking cover behind them. I also saw alot of tracers going back and forth between the vehicles and the jungle where the NVA were firing from. Wollman didn't slow down on this pass as we were real, real close to the battle.
At the northern end of his holding pattern, after we had flown over the ambush site and passed it, Wollman made a 180 degree turn and flew back to the northern end of the fire fight and continued south until we had to make another 180 degree turn to continue closing the loop on the holding pattern. I was glad of that because when we were heading south, I couldn't see as much as I could when we were heading north.
As we reached the ambush site, I looked out the right window of the cockpit and saw a Cobra gunship in a screaming dive as he prepared to make his gun run. I hadn't flown a Cobra at that time but had heard they would come in at 190 MPH which was the maximum speed allowable.
At exactly that time, a 51 caliber anti aircraft position opened fire on the Cobra and I watched it scream to the ground and explode with a fireball that reached roughly half the height of where we were flying. It was the largest ball of fire I ever saw during my entire tour. You may well imagine that all I have to do is close my eyes and rerun the horrors of that sight. We couldn't tell for sure but it appeared that the 51 caliber had gone through the cockpit and almost certainly killed both men instantly.
I say that because the Cobra never changed attitude. If they had taken a round in the rotor system, the ship would have gone haywire and been completely out of control. Regardless of where the rounds landed, when you are in a dive at 190 miles per hour and only flying at 1,500 feet, the time to hit the ground is nothing. It all happened in a flash and every bit of it was happening right outside my door.
The Colonel came on the intercom and ordered us to "Get the hell out of here". Initially, I didn't like the order as I wanted to let the gunners do their thing and kill as many NVA as possible. Despite the thoughts I had about leaving the area, I later learned that the Colonel had been cautioned by MACV to NOT be killed in the field like General Bond which had been the case just a short time before that.
As soon as Wollman banked away from the battle and did as the Colonel ordered us to do, he told us all that he was very sorry to see that we had just lost "our brothers". I knew he wasn't running from a fight because I'd already seen him command another battle from our ship and realized that it was a much wiser thing for him to do than get killed and leave the battle field without a commander to run things.
Many years later, when computers became available, I found the "Brigade Summaries" from the 199th and, as a curiosity, read them to see what was there. I saw that there was a report that an AH 1G Cobra was lost on that day. I knew I had found the report of the shoot down but was somewhat disappointed that it didn't have more detail to it.
When the Virtual Wall came about, I went to the section of all KIAs on July 4th, 1970. I found the listing of a couple of Cobras that were shot down on that day. When I looked further into the report, I noticed that it gave the Province where each had been shot down and knew that one was the Cobra I saw. That led me to the names of the two pilots that were killed in action that day.
When I went I went to their site on the Wall, I entered a memorial statement for CWOs Jernigan and Stearns and did the best I could to deliver an eyewitness report of the battle that took their lives. I eliminated the details of the battle and focused more on the size of the battle and the bravery of the two men. At that end of it, I left my name, my unit and my email address.
I was quite surprised to receive an email from Stearns son. He had been trying for years to find out what had happened to his father as the only thing he remembered came from the day that the Army sent a chaplain with the notice that his father had been killed on a "routine air patrol".
Stearns son explained that he and the rest of his family, had that empty feeling that comes with hearing the news that your brother and father was killed in action and the further emptiness that comes with not having a clue of how it happened.
When I received that email I could almost hear the pleading of his son to find out how his father died. I totally eliminated the horrors of the moments they spent in the last seconds of their life. I focused on the size of the battle and the fact that his dad and Jernigan had been strafing the enemy with their Cobra and after their last gun run, with the death of so many NVA, the battle had ended.
For several years, on July 4th, we exchanged emails and wished each other well. He even sent me news of Stearns grand kids and that he had given his Uncle, Stearns brother, the news that I had passed along to him. I've always hoped, in some way, that the news we shared gave the family some relief in knowing the truth about their last moments on earth.
I didn't get into the details from the ground as was reported to me later by one of the guys in our unit that made it to the Cobra to see if there was anyone who survived. I have often wondered how many families of men killed in action, suffered from not knowing anything about their son except he was killed. I've felt pretty good about doing that and each July 4th, I go through those memories again. Tough day for all.
Any degree of calm was totally blown away when we received the word that one of our convoys was involved in an ambush and a huge fire fight was underway. We ran to the helicopter followed by the Colonel who was also running. The sight of the boss running toward the Huey wasn't exactly the kind of thing that inspires a laid back attitude. I had only been in Vietnam for six weeks and even though I'd had some combat time, this seemed to be a totally different atmosphere than the one you have when you are sitting in front of a map planning a mission for the next day.
The Colonel didn't explain the size and scope of the battle. He only said that there was an ambush not far away and that Wollman should "fly up the road". I remember that Wollman had the Huey up and running and did one of those military take offs that we knew was one that was only done when the situation was one of life and death.
I could see a couple of helicopters orbiting the area and I heard the Colonel tell Wollman to stay west of the road and make north south passes. I'd already witnessed that kind of holding pattern and I knew that the Colonel was aware of artillery shells being fired into the scene where the NVA were fighting from.
That holding pattern put the copilot's seat on the side of the helicopter closest to the firefight. It's like riding shot gun in a car when your driver turns in front of on coming traffic that's very close. Usually, a comment follows that kind of turn in a car where the passenger says something like: "Hey that's on MY side".
I could see a line of vehicles on the road with alot of men taking cover behind them. I also saw alot of tracers going back and forth between the vehicles and the jungle where the NVA were firing from. Wollman didn't slow down on this pass as we were real, real close to the battle.
At the northern end of his holding pattern, after we had flown over the ambush site and passed it, Wollman made a 180 degree turn and flew back to the northern end of the fire fight and continued south until we had to make another 180 degree turn to continue closing the loop on the holding pattern. I was glad of that because when we were heading south, I couldn't see as much as I could when we were heading north.
As we reached the ambush site, I looked out the right window of the cockpit and saw a Cobra gunship in a screaming dive as he prepared to make his gun run. I hadn't flown a Cobra at that time but had heard they would come in at 190 MPH which was the maximum speed allowable.
At exactly that time, a 51 caliber anti aircraft position opened fire on the Cobra and I watched it scream to the ground and explode with a fireball that reached roughly half the height of where we were flying. It was the largest ball of fire I ever saw during my entire tour. You may well imagine that all I have to do is close my eyes and rerun the horrors of that sight. We couldn't tell for sure but it appeared that the 51 caliber had gone through the cockpit and almost certainly killed both men instantly.
I say that because the Cobra never changed attitude. If they had taken a round in the rotor system, the ship would have gone haywire and been completely out of control. Regardless of where the rounds landed, when you are in a dive at 190 miles per hour and only flying at 1,500 feet, the time to hit the ground is nothing. It all happened in a flash and every bit of it was happening right outside my door.
The Colonel came on the intercom and ordered us to "Get the hell out of here". Initially, I didn't like the order as I wanted to let the gunners do their thing and kill as many NVA as possible. Despite the thoughts I had about leaving the area, I later learned that the Colonel had been cautioned by MACV to NOT be killed in the field like General Bond which had been the case just a short time before that.
As soon as Wollman banked away from the battle and did as the Colonel ordered us to do, he told us all that he was very sorry to see that we had just lost "our brothers". I knew he wasn't running from a fight because I'd already seen him command another battle from our ship and realized that it was a much wiser thing for him to do than get killed and leave the battle field without a commander to run things.
Many years later, when computers became available, I found the "Brigade Summaries" from the 199th and, as a curiosity, read them to see what was there. I saw that there was a report that an AH 1G Cobra was lost on that day. I knew I had found the report of the shoot down but was somewhat disappointed that it didn't have more detail to it.
When the Virtual Wall came about, I went to the section of all KIAs on July 4th, 1970. I found the listing of a couple of Cobras that were shot down on that day. When I looked further into the report, I noticed that it gave the Province where each had been shot down and knew that one was the Cobra I saw. That led me to the names of the two pilots that were killed in action that day.
When I went I went to their site on the Wall, I entered a memorial statement for CWOs Jernigan and Stearns and did the best I could to deliver an eyewitness report of the battle that took their lives. I eliminated the details of the battle and focused more on the size of the battle and the bravery of the two men. At that end of it, I left my name, my unit and my email address.
I was quite surprised to receive an email from Stearns son. He had been trying for years to find out what had happened to his father as the only thing he remembered came from the day that the Army sent a chaplain with the notice that his father had been killed on a "routine air patrol".
Stearns son explained that he and the rest of his family, had that empty feeling that comes with hearing the news that your brother and father was killed in action and the further emptiness that comes with not having a clue of how it happened.
When I received that email I could almost hear the pleading of his son to find out how his father died. I totally eliminated the horrors of the moments they spent in the last seconds of their life. I focused on the size of the battle and the fact that his dad and Jernigan had been strafing the enemy with their Cobra and after their last gun run, with the death of so many NVA, the battle had ended.
For several years, on July 4th, we exchanged emails and wished each other well. He even sent me news of Stearns grand kids and that he had given his Uncle, Stearns brother, the news that I had passed along to him. I've always hoped, in some way, that the news we shared gave the family some relief in knowing the truth about their last moments on earth.
I didn't get into the details from the ground as was reported to me later by one of the guys in our unit that made it to the Cobra to see if there was anyone who survived. I have often wondered how many families of men killed in action, suffered from not knowing anything about their son except he was killed. I've felt pretty good about doing that and each July 4th, I go through those memories again. Tough day for all.
Sunday, April 1, 2012
Rule #1, Do Not Screw With My Crew, part 2.
If you have not already done so, please read the previous post before starting this one.
After we landed and the 5 members of the LRRP team headed off for a meal and their mission report, we pretty much laid back and prepared for the flight back to Long Binh. By the time the LRRPs were finished and more than anxious to get back to the rear area, we saw them walk out of the Tactical Operations Center and slowly meander toward our helicopter. As an extra added bonus, the 2nd Lt was seen following them out of the TOC.
As he approached the helicopter, he took a piece of paper out of his pocket and began waving it in the air. By the time he came to within ear shot, he started waving and loudly saying: "I've got priority here, I've got priority. You'll have to kick off a CREW MEMBER before you try to kick ME off. It's signed by the Colonel, it's signed by the Colonel".
At that exact moment in time, I remember looking back at Little O to see what his face looked like. I guess it was natural for me to think that way because Little O was famous for being a great shot but also famous for telling people to kiss his ass if the situation warranted it. I didn't think Little O was going to shoot the Lt but it would not have surprised me one bit if he had doubled up his fists and knocked the Lt on his ass or knocked him out completely.
Finally, Little O turned his head toward me and we made eye contact. When I saw the twinkle in his eye, right after I noticed the incredibly wide grin on his face, I realized that there had to be a Rule #2 that I didn't know anything about. I soon found out that there was. It goes something like this: "Whatever you do, if you are a passenger, For God's sake, don't piss off the Aircraft Commander".
The part they didn't mention was the verbage right after "piss off the Aircraft Commander". It had a number of additions to it like: "You WILL vomit on this flight". There were other sayings that were presented by the crew kinda like a stand up comic would deliver a comedy skit.
I remember "You WILL think you are going to die", "You're gonna WISH you were DEAD before this flight is over" or one of my favorites: "Your dumb ass SHOULD have gone to the latrene BEFORE you got on this helicopter".
Despite all the upset just prior to a helicopter flight, the LRRPs got on board followed by the Lt. I don't remember where he was sitting but I heard the AC tell O and the crew chief to quietly inform the LRRPs to cinch their seat belts tightly. I could still see the grin on O's face and I knew whatever it was, I was about to witness something that was going to be aerobatically unusual.
I didn't know that they'd talked to the LRRPs on the way back to Mace and told them the details surrounding the LT and what they'd been going through that morning. In any event, in a very short period of time we were west of Xuan Loc and flying right above the tree tops as fast as the Huey could fly.
I heard "Here we go" through the intercom and then experienced a high speed cyclic climb. That maneuver occurs when you pull back on the "stick" which tilts the rotor in a manner that puts you in the fastest climb rate possible. You can literally transition from straight and level flight to one that is almost vertical and going "straight up". You can experience G forces in a Huey but I never felt it wise to do so unless we were in combat and needed a position to effect a proper shot angle.
About half way through the maneuver, at a time when the G forces were pushing everybody down in their seats, you can push the stick forward and lower the collective lever which takes all of the "bite" out of the rotor blades, and almost be weightless. We were never allowed to put the Huey in a negative G maneuver because the rotor blades might come off, but we could do some rather hairy aerobatics without surpassing those kinds of limitations.
Now that I think about it, I think the Lt had elected to ride on the cargo floor and stretch out instead of being cooped up in a small seat with his attache case. I can only imagine the horrors he was going through. I could hear him cussing and when I did, we went back to straight and level flight.
I remember another maneuver where the anti torque pedals were pushed to the right side making the helicopter fly out of trim to the left. It wasn't bothering me at all but I'm sure the Lt. in the back was praying to God that he would survive and the flight would end.
Shortly after the last "out of trim" maneuver, Long Binh showed up and we made our approach to land at the same Fireball Aviation Pad where we had kicked the Lt off earlier that morning. As we set the helicopter down, the Lt was the first one out of the ship. The only thing he had to say as he was getting out of the helicopter, he said at the top of his lungs. "G** D**** Fireball Pilots". With that, he left the aircraft, didn't say another word and we never saw him again during my entire time with the 199th Light Infantry Brigade.
I'd hate to let this story go without giving the proper credit to whomever was flying Aircraft Commander that day but I think I've found a link to Craig Wollman. Femmer flew with Dell and Freemen as gunner and crew chief more often than not. Since Little O was on board and Wollman and I had flown with Ochadluss on several occasions, I'd have to take a guess and say that Craig either invented the rules or perfected their applications to a degree that might be considered "an art". He was like that, once he was committed, that was it, he was going to get the job done and get everybody back alive and that's exactly what he did.
I hoped you like this story especially since it's true. We rarely had problems like that but their were a few occasions where some had to be educated in the proper conduct of passengers.
After we landed and the 5 members of the LRRP team headed off for a meal and their mission report, we pretty much laid back and prepared for the flight back to Long Binh. By the time the LRRPs were finished and more than anxious to get back to the rear area, we saw them walk out of the Tactical Operations Center and slowly meander toward our helicopter. As an extra added bonus, the 2nd Lt was seen following them out of the TOC.
As he approached the helicopter, he took a piece of paper out of his pocket and began waving it in the air. By the time he came to within ear shot, he started waving and loudly saying: "I've got priority here, I've got priority. You'll have to kick off a CREW MEMBER before you try to kick ME off. It's signed by the Colonel, it's signed by the Colonel".
At that exact moment in time, I remember looking back at Little O to see what his face looked like. I guess it was natural for me to think that way because Little O was famous for being a great shot but also famous for telling people to kiss his ass if the situation warranted it. I didn't think Little O was going to shoot the Lt but it would not have surprised me one bit if he had doubled up his fists and knocked the Lt on his ass or knocked him out completely.
Finally, Little O turned his head toward me and we made eye contact. When I saw the twinkle in his eye, right after I noticed the incredibly wide grin on his face, I realized that there had to be a Rule #2 that I didn't know anything about. I soon found out that there was. It goes something like this: "Whatever you do, if you are a passenger, For God's sake, don't piss off the Aircraft Commander".
The part they didn't mention was the verbage right after "piss off the Aircraft Commander". It had a number of additions to it like: "You WILL vomit on this flight". There were other sayings that were presented by the crew kinda like a stand up comic would deliver a comedy skit.
I remember "You WILL think you are going to die", "You're gonna WISH you were DEAD before this flight is over" or one of my favorites: "Your dumb ass SHOULD have gone to the latrene BEFORE you got on this helicopter".
Despite all the upset just prior to a helicopter flight, the LRRPs got on board followed by the Lt. I don't remember where he was sitting but I heard the AC tell O and the crew chief to quietly inform the LRRPs to cinch their seat belts tightly. I could still see the grin on O's face and I knew whatever it was, I was about to witness something that was going to be aerobatically unusual.
I didn't know that they'd talked to the LRRPs on the way back to Mace and told them the details surrounding the LT and what they'd been going through that morning. In any event, in a very short period of time we were west of Xuan Loc and flying right above the tree tops as fast as the Huey could fly.
I heard "Here we go" through the intercom and then experienced a high speed cyclic climb. That maneuver occurs when you pull back on the "stick" which tilts the rotor in a manner that puts you in the fastest climb rate possible. You can literally transition from straight and level flight to one that is almost vertical and going "straight up". You can experience G forces in a Huey but I never felt it wise to do so unless we were in combat and needed a position to effect a proper shot angle.
About half way through the maneuver, at a time when the G forces were pushing everybody down in their seats, you can push the stick forward and lower the collective lever which takes all of the "bite" out of the rotor blades, and almost be weightless. We were never allowed to put the Huey in a negative G maneuver because the rotor blades might come off, but we could do some rather hairy aerobatics without surpassing those kinds of limitations.
Now that I think about it, I think the Lt had elected to ride on the cargo floor and stretch out instead of being cooped up in a small seat with his attache case. I can only imagine the horrors he was going through. I could hear him cussing and when I did, we went back to straight and level flight.
I remember another maneuver where the anti torque pedals were pushed to the right side making the helicopter fly out of trim to the left. It wasn't bothering me at all but I'm sure the Lt. in the back was praying to God that he would survive and the flight would end.
Shortly after the last "out of trim" maneuver, Long Binh showed up and we made our approach to land at the same Fireball Aviation Pad where we had kicked the Lt off earlier that morning. As we set the helicopter down, the Lt was the first one out of the ship. The only thing he had to say as he was getting out of the helicopter, he said at the top of his lungs. "G** D**** Fireball Pilots". With that, he left the aircraft, didn't say another word and we never saw him again during my entire time with the 199th Light Infantry Brigade.
I'd hate to let this story go without giving the proper credit to whomever was flying Aircraft Commander that day but I think I've found a link to Craig Wollman. Femmer flew with Dell and Freemen as gunner and crew chief more often than not. Since Little O was on board and Wollman and I had flown with Ochadluss on several occasions, I'd have to take a guess and say that Craig either invented the rules or perfected their applications to a degree that might be considered "an art". He was like that, once he was committed, that was it, he was going to get the job done and get everybody back alive and that's exactly what he did.
I hoped you like this story especially since it's true. We rarely had problems like that but their were a few occasions where some had to be educated in the proper conduct of passengers.
Rule #1, Do Not Screw With My Crew
I'm not sure if it was Terry Femmer or Craig Wollman that invented Rule #1 but the sounds of this one has Craig Wollman written all over it. I say that because of the previous notes I made about OAT, EGT and TORQUE readings. For the McInnis girls that are reading this, let me say that it stands for Outside Air Temperature, Exhaust Gas Temperature and, in a sense, the power it takes to hover.
Early one morning we were advised that we had an Ash and Trash mission to fly from Long Binh to Xuan Loc. I was glad to hear it because Ash and Trash typically meant we were to haul mail, ammunition, documents from Headquarters and any number of things that weren't directly indicative of a combat mission.
About the time I showed up and did the co-pilot thing of pre-flighting the helicopter, I noticed that the crew had already loaded the Huey with a huge shipment of things that was secured with a net that was attached to the D rings in the floor of the ship. That was done to insure that there would be no way possible for anything to be blown out of the cargo area and end up in the tail rotor. Having accomplished that, we began to check our side arms, put on our bullet proof vests and climb into the cockpit.
Before I was able to mount up, there were voices on the left rear side of the helicopter that were filled with tension so I decided to go there and see what was going on. It appeared that a spit polished, geek looking O1, Second Lt., showed up and had commenced to chew Little O out for not having his hair properly trimmed and his boots spit polished. I heard something to the effect that "This is a GD combat zone, not the Stateside Army". Even though I had only been in Vietnam for 7 or 8 weeks at that time, I knew that the shit was about to hit the fan.
An Aircraft Commander is an almighty and powerful position that takes precedence over all other officers, regardless of rank, during flight. Whoever was AC that day, he managed to get things calmed down and all of us climbed aboard and took our stations.
I remember that the helicopter was beginning to "get light on the skids" which is a phrase we used to describe that part of the take off where we were almost airborne but not quite. When we lifted up to a hover, the collective was immediately lowered and the helicopter was put back on the ground in a manner that was a bit rough instead of the usual soft landing. "We appear to be a bit heavy", came through the intercom. He did the same maneuver again and shook his head, looking at the instrument panel as if something was wrong.
Once again, but to better effect this time, the helicopter was light on the skids and the AC managed to skid the helicopter along the asphalt taxi way before he brought it to a hover. He checked the OAT, EGT and torque and promptly put it back on the ground with the unusual rough landing.
He turned around and, with raised voice to overcome the engine and rotor blade noise, told the Lt that we were dangerously overloaded and that he would have to get out and wait a minute for another ride that the AC would call for by radio.
The Lt, somewhat shaken by the rough experience from the helicopter jumping up and down and skidding around the tarmac, gladly left the helicopter and began walking toward the Fireball Aviation hanger. At that time, he was totally without the slightest idea that "another ride" was going to be in our jeep and that a jeep ride to Xuan Loc, with the craziest jeep driver in the entire Army, could be a scary thing for those who had no combat experience and didn't know the area.
I could visualize the ass chewing that West would take regarding the condition of his boots and the horror filled ride the Lt would take as a result of that.
We flew the short flight to Mace and a squad of infantrymen unloaded the helicopter and took the entire contents inside the burm. I still don't know what it was but I know that with full fuel and cargo we were heavy but we weren't THAT heavy.
We waited around the Fire Base for orders and before the Lt. arrived, we were given orders to retrieve a long range patrol that had been in the jungle for days. I was pretty comfortable with that as we had inserted them for their mission and nothing at all had happened to us during the insertion.
The Aircraft Commander told me to fly the mission, locate the men, make the approach, the pick up and extraction. I was excited about that as most of my actual flight time had been acting as a co-pilot who only flew to and from places. Since I had the radio frequency to contact the patrol and an estimated location for them, I got on the radio and made the call so our Automatic Direction Finder would locate the signal and give us a heading to fly to their location.
I dialed in the frequency and made the call: "Ground 6, Ground 6, this is Fireball 28". After two attempts at locating them, a very whispered answer came across the head set. "Fireball 28, this is Ground 6, I have you 5 x 5, all clear". If it was "all clear, I wondered why in the hell he was whispering. Despite that, I asked him to give me a 5 count so my radio could lock in on his location. When he responded with "1,2,3,4,5,5,4,3,2,1", we locked into his signal, made a small course correction and continued heading toward the position of the signal. I told him that we had a good fix on him and were getting close to his location.
In just a matter of minutes he called. "Fireball this is Ground 6, we hear and will call when you are in sight". In the distance, we could see the large opening in the jungle where we'd dropped them at the beginning of their mission and noticed that the ADF needle was pointing directly at that area. "Fireball, Ground 6, we see you and will pop smoke". He was still whispering and I was still wondering why in the world he had to whisper if it was all clear.
The AC let me make the approach to the smoke and almost instantly, 5 men, who had been sweating every day for 5 days in the jungle without benefit of showers, jumped aboard the Huey. The last man was yelling, "Go, go, go". Amidst the fragrance of a football locker room, I took off and headed back to Mace and the Lt. jeep rider who we had not yet seen.
I'll stop now as the second meeting with the smart ass Lt will need a bit more room than I have left here.
Stand by for another punishment episode for those who break Rule #1.
Early one morning we were advised that we had an Ash and Trash mission to fly from Long Binh to Xuan Loc. I was glad to hear it because Ash and Trash typically meant we were to haul mail, ammunition, documents from Headquarters and any number of things that weren't directly indicative of a combat mission.
About the time I showed up and did the co-pilot thing of pre-flighting the helicopter, I noticed that the crew had already loaded the Huey with a huge shipment of things that was secured with a net that was attached to the D rings in the floor of the ship. That was done to insure that there would be no way possible for anything to be blown out of the cargo area and end up in the tail rotor. Having accomplished that, we began to check our side arms, put on our bullet proof vests and climb into the cockpit.
Before I was able to mount up, there were voices on the left rear side of the helicopter that were filled with tension so I decided to go there and see what was going on. It appeared that a spit polished, geek looking O1, Second Lt., showed up and had commenced to chew Little O out for not having his hair properly trimmed and his boots spit polished. I heard something to the effect that "This is a GD combat zone, not the Stateside Army". Even though I had only been in Vietnam for 7 or 8 weeks at that time, I knew that the shit was about to hit the fan.
An Aircraft Commander is an almighty and powerful position that takes precedence over all other officers, regardless of rank, during flight. Whoever was AC that day, he managed to get things calmed down and all of us climbed aboard and took our stations.
I remember that the helicopter was beginning to "get light on the skids" which is a phrase we used to describe that part of the take off where we were almost airborne but not quite. When we lifted up to a hover, the collective was immediately lowered and the helicopter was put back on the ground in a manner that was a bit rough instead of the usual soft landing. "We appear to be a bit heavy", came through the intercom. He did the same maneuver again and shook his head, looking at the instrument panel as if something was wrong.
Once again, but to better effect this time, the helicopter was light on the skids and the AC managed to skid the helicopter along the asphalt taxi way before he brought it to a hover. He checked the OAT, EGT and torque and promptly put it back on the ground with the unusual rough landing.
He turned around and, with raised voice to overcome the engine and rotor blade noise, told the Lt that we were dangerously overloaded and that he would have to get out and wait a minute for another ride that the AC would call for by radio.
The Lt, somewhat shaken by the rough experience from the helicopter jumping up and down and skidding around the tarmac, gladly left the helicopter and began walking toward the Fireball Aviation hanger. At that time, he was totally without the slightest idea that "another ride" was going to be in our jeep and that a jeep ride to Xuan Loc, with the craziest jeep driver in the entire Army, could be a scary thing for those who had no combat experience and didn't know the area.
I could visualize the ass chewing that West would take regarding the condition of his boots and the horror filled ride the Lt would take as a result of that.
We flew the short flight to Mace and a squad of infantrymen unloaded the helicopter and took the entire contents inside the burm. I still don't know what it was but I know that with full fuel and cargo we were heavy but we weren't THAT heavy.
We waited around the Fire Base for orders and before the Lt. arrived, we were given orders to retrieve a long range patrol that had been in the jungle for days. I was pretty comfortable with that as we had inserted them for their mission and nothing at all had happened to us during the insertion.
The Aircraft Commander told me to fly the mission, locate the men, make the approach, the pick up and extraction. I was excited about that as most of my actual flight time had been acting as a co-pilot who only flew to and from places. Since I had the radio frequency to contact the patrol and an estimated location for them, I got on the radio and made the call so our Automatic Direction Finder would locate the signal and give us a heading to fly to their location.
I dialed in the frequency and made the call: "Ground 6, Ground 6, this is Fireball 28". After two attempts at locating them, a very whispered answer came across the head set. "Fireball 28, this is Ground 6, I have you 5 x 5, all clear". If it was "all clear, I wondered why in the hell he was whispering. Despite that, I asked him to give me a 5 count so my radio could lock in on his location. When he responded with "1,2,3,4,5,5,4,3,2,1", we locked into his signal, made a small course correction and continued heading toward the position of the signal. I told him that we had a good fix on him and were getting close to his location.
In just a matter of minutes he called. "Fireball this is Ground 6, we hear and will call when you are in sight". In the distance, we could see the large opening in the jungle where we'd dropped them at the beginning of their mission and noticed that the ADF needle was pointing directly at that area. "Fireball, Ground 6, we see you and will pop smoke". He was still whispering and I was still wondering why in the world he had to whisper if it was all clear.
The AC let me make the approach to the smoke and almost instantly, 5 men, who had been sweating every day for 5 days in the jungle without benefit of showers, jumped aboard the Huey. The last man was yelling, "Go, go, go". Amidst the fragrance of a football locker room, I took off and headed back to Mace and the Lt. jeep rider who we had not yet seen.
I'll stop now as the second meeting with the smart ass Lt will need a bit more room than I have left here.
Stand by for another punishment episode for those who break Rule #1.
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