Monday, April 30, 2012

All night long fire fight

Our Tactical Operations Center at FSB Mace, received an urgent radio call one night, and we discovered that one of our units had come into contact with a large enemy force and needed immediate air support.

With our Huey already preflighted and full of fuel and ammo, we took off and flew to a mountainous area just north north west of Phan Thiet and made radio contact with our guys on the ground. In a very short period of time, Wollman located them and headed to the south end of a canyon that was surrounded on two sides by the mountains that were common place in that part of the Southern Central Highlands. (It wasn't far from the battle field I earlier described where Wollman more or less stopped the Huey so the Colonel could command the battle field and we would be out of artillery lines of fire).

Unfortunately for us, at the south end of the canyon, there was another mountain that made it impossible to maintain a constant altitude and gun run at low level. If we did, we would have crashed into the southern most mountain. This further complicated the situation because we had not yet located the exact location of our troops. To add difficulty to that situation, it was pitch dark and our guys were in very close combat with the NVA/VC. To worsen the situation, the whole damn thing was going down very close to the point where all three of the mountain peaks intersected with one another.

About that time, we saw a USAF C 47, "Puff the Magic Dragon", approaching the firefight from a higher altitude, flying east to west over the area. We exchanged radio communications with them and a decision was made regarding who was best suited to take the primary role of air support. They couldn't get to an altitude as low as we were because of the mountains and, because they couldn't identify the exact position of our men, Wollman took the lead and had them stand by.

We were asked to fly down the canyon and shoot some marking rounds with the M 60's. This was done to insure that we were hitting the exact area that our men needed the fire and that no friendly fire casualties would exist.

I'd never seen any of the Aircraft Commanders order the crew to point their weapons forward, hold them steady and on his command, shoot a one second burst. This allowed Wollman to direct the bullets to the target area that he'd been given by the ground commander. He did that and was told by the ground commander that he'd hit the target and "pour it on". At that time, the gunners knew where the target area was but we were running out of space because the mountain at the end of the canyon was fast approaching.

In any event, we made a couple of effective gun runs and the guys on the ground reported that we needed to keep it coming. By the time all this unfolded, we began to run low on fuel and ammo and reported that we would make the short flight to Phan Thiet to resupply.

We did that, returned to the fight and continued to supply the effective gun runs that our guys needed. It seemed that no time had passed when we were again needing to fly back to Phan Thiet for more ammo and fuel. When we advised the ground commander that we were going to get more fuel and ammo, he advised us that they were running low on ammo and needed us to pick up a number of things at Phat Thiet.

Wollman must have radio'd the crew at Phan Thiet and told them we were coming in and needed a quick turn around including the resupply of ammo for the ground troops. When we landed at re-supply, I noticed a couple of enlisted men dragging the heavy ammo boxes that contained everything from M 60 and M 16 ammunition to hand grenades and M 70 rounds.

Wollman had been flying all night long and I, as a newbie co pilot, was pretty much involved with observations and cross checks on the instrument panel. I think he let me fly from Phan Thiet back to an area close the ingress point of our previous gun runs so he could stretch his legs and crack his fingers.

In any event, he took the controls again and began what I thought would be another gun run. I was wrong on that assumption because he was constantly on the radio with the ground commander and was slowing down instead of speeding up.

In a very short period of time, he brought the helicopter to a stop as the men below had directed us to a point where we could be certain that they would get the ammo and not the enemy. When they told us to stop and drop the ammo, I turned my head and watched the ammo boxes being shoved out of the Huey. I followed them as they fell through the tree tops and was more than a little relieved to hear the radio call that the drop was perfect.

By the time all these things transpired, we, and the guys on the ground, must have killed enough of the bad guys to turn the tide of battle as the ground commander seemed to think that they were going to be okay. Shortly thereafter, we left the area and began our flight home as we had been flying and fighting all night long. I don't remember if there was another Huey on station to take our place but I do remember that I felt lucky to be alive after experiencing a night mission that ended up being the longest combat assault I'd ever made at night during my entire tour.

I'm almost certain that I flew the ship back to FSB Mace as Wollman had been doing 99% of the flying that night. When we got to Mace the sun was coming up and we stopped long enough to make our report, take a break and eat breakfast. We were released and told to fly back to Long Binh and get some rest, which we gladly did.

When we landed, Major Stiner was waiting on us and had us stand in formation for an awards and decoration ceremony. I received my Bronze Star that morning and even though it wasn't for that particular fight, I was extremely proud to receive it as it is not an award for aircrew members. I simply assumed it was for my conduct during a couple of rocket and mortar attacks we experienced at Mace or one of the fire bases while I was there.

I remember that the Major knew all about the night long mission we'd just completed and was real happy to hear him acknowledge that and release us for some well deserved showers and sleep.

Of all the regrets I have from Vietnam, this particular mission stands at the top. I don't regret the experience of having seen that much combat in so small a time frame. On the other hand, I am quite appreciative of the tactical lessons I was privileged to see Wollman deliver that night. Despite that, I do regret that I didn't know anything at all about Awards and Decorations and through my ignorance, did not recommend him for the Distinguished Flying Cross. I have regretted that for forty years. In the past two years, I've communicated with a Colonel about that but was told it was beyond his control and that too many years had passed. I still regret that.

For whatever it is worth to all of you, last November, I commissioned an artist to make "A Copilot's Distinguished Flying Cross" to send to Craig for his military keep sakes. I thought I could send it by Christmas but here I am in May still waiting. Oh well, what can a guy with half a brain say?

This will conclude the posts regarding my combat experiences from my days with Fireball Aviation and the 199th Light Infantry Brigade. I haven't mentioned all the guys and simply think that I lack the words or skills to express those things so this will have to do for all. Special thanks to Craig Wollman, the greatest night combat pilot I ever knew. Thanks also to Dudley, Terry, Ed, JJ, Bob, Cpt. Moore, Kat Ballew and the many incredible gunners and crew chiefs we had the good fortune to have as our crews.

Next, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Air Cav Troop and the invasion of Cambodia.














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Sunday, April 29, 2012

Next to last combat mission 199th

Since this is the next to the last combat mission I intend to post, I want to make a statement and then issue a warning. The statement surrounds the fact that I am the only one still alive that witnessed this so I can't offend any individual. Next, if you have weak stomach, stop now.

One morning, we received an order to provide air cover for one of our fire bases as it was undergoing a ground attack by Viet Cong. We loaded up and flew to the fire base as fast as possible. When we arrived, we'd learned that the base had been penetrated by the VC but they had been killed and the rest of the attacking VC were retreating back to the jungle with a LRRP team hot on their heals.

We landed inside the base perimeter and shut down the Huey. I noticed 3 VC prisoners who had been tied up and were under guard by several of the men who had fought the battle. I also noticed a VC body that had made it to the wire surrounding the camp but had been killed just as he was preparing to cross the wire.

It was a ghastly sight. He'd been hit cross ways with what appeared to be a 50 caliber round because the front of his body had been opened from right to left and his entrails had fallen out of his body and were completely exposed. It was the only bullet hole I found but it was one huge opening that included the entire front of his body. It was almost as if a surgeon had taken a scalpel and opened him from side to side. I experienced / witnessed another 50 caliber wound later in my tour but I'll save that for part of the experiences I had with the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

I also noticed that the 3 VC prisoners were not wearing blindfolds. Their hands were tied behind their backs and had no chance of escaping but they were placed in a manner where they had to look at their dead comrade. When I inspected the dead VC I noticed that he'd shit in his pants and with the smell of all that, I backed away from the area and was told to stand inside a mortar pit and observe the mortars that were going to be fired as the LRRP team had located the retreating VC and were preparing to attack.

As they began to shoot the mortar rounds, I was told to hold my ears and watch the rounds as they left the tube, flew skyward to the apex of it's flight and then dropped to the impact point. I'd never seen that before and was quite surprised to see and know that you could watch the round from it's firing point until it blew up when it hit the jungle.

I was also able to watch the small adjustments that could be made when the LRRPs adjusted the impact points after the first round hit. After a couple of adjustments, it was clear that they had received an order to fire at will. The mortar team was shooting as fast as the mortars could be dropped down the tube. It was impressive to be that close to the fight and watch it all unfold from a relative point of safety.

We were told to load up and as I walked toward the Huey I began to make a head count of the men making their way to the helicopter. We brought an interpreter with us and with the 3 VC prisoners, that made 4. We had our gunner and crew chief as well as a Command Sgt. Major and a high  ranking officer from Brigade so that made 4 more. Adding me and the other pilot, we now would be flying back to home base with a total of ten men on board. I had already flown with 9 men on board and had covered that in an earlier post where we picked up the LRRP team that "whispered" when we communicated with them just before extracting them from their LZ. If you read that, you will recall the "smell" I described.

I don't know how long the VC  had been in the jungle without any bath but I do know they smelled like a combination of a dead fish and a football locker room. In any event, the were seated on the extreme right hand side of the Huey with their feet and legs hanging out of the side of the helicopter. We were told to proceed to a rail road track that used to be a main artery to that part of the country and to fly high speed and low level which we did.

I could hear the interpreter yelling at the VC one by one and after a few minutes of that, we were told to climb to 1,500 feet and fly back to base. As soon as we arrived at our cruising altitude, I turned around to take a look at the prisoners to see what the first time helicopter riders were experiencing. Their eyes were wide open and as the interpreter was putting blind folds on them, it was clear that they were scared to pieces.

As the interpreter continued to yell at them, we were told two things. First, we were told that the interpreter was demanding that the VC give them the location of the unit they belonged to and where they were from. The second thing had to do with our final approach to base. We were told to stop at a 3 foot hover and not to put the ship on the ground.

When we confirmed the order, we were told to start slowing down to reduce the wind flow inside the aircraft and to slowly reach a temperature that might be closer to the one they had experienced and seen when we were flying fast and low over the rail road tracks. We complied with the order and made our approach but stopped at a 3' hover as expected.

I noticed a number of men waiting for us as we made our approach and that each of them were carrying M 16s. For those of you who have never stood close to a Huey when it's at a hover, let me say that it is loud. Above all the noise, even with our helmets on, we heard the incessant screams of the interpreter as he continued to ask them, one by one, where their unit was. When he asked the last man in the line of 3 where their unit was and he refused to tell him what he wanted, he went back to the VC in the middle and asked him. When he didn't respond, the interpreter kicked him out of the ship. He thought he was flying high over the tracks and his scream was heard by all. Even though he only fell 36" or so, the other two VC immediately began to talk and the interpreter was told everything he wanted to know.

As horrible as that may sound, in reality, it was more like jumping off your kitchen table than anything else. The VC that took the dive was not injured at all except for a level of being freaked out like a dope head on a bad acid trip. He didn't even need a band aid.

Having said and experienced all this, you may well imagine how happy I was to know that we had obtained the location of the VC that made the attack on our base as well as the village where other VC were located. You may also imagine what my thoughts are about the water boarding incidents that took place at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. I could have solved that issue with a small ride in Timmy's helicopter.

One more post to go before I leave the 199th when they go home. Stand by, the best one I've saved until last.

   

 

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Friday, April 27, 2012

Long Binh to Tuy Hoa via Phan Thiet.


Major Lewis, the Kappa Alpha C.O. I referred to early on in these posts, received orders to transfer to Tuy Hoa and Major Stiner came in to take his place commanding the Fireball Aviation Section of the 199th. Normally that wouldn't be such a big deal but in this case it was. Not only was Major Stiner an incredible leader and perfect officer to take command of our section but he was a strategist as well, and one who had very insightful methods as it relates to combat operations.

Instead of catching a fixed wing aircraft to Tuy Hoa, a very long distance flight for a helicopter, he chose us to fly him there. I've often thought that he did that because he knew that most of the fixed wing flight would have been over the mountains and if anything at all went wrong, they would end up in the jungles or the mountains and have a most difficult time with rescue.

We left Long Binh very early one morning, picked up Major Lewis in Xuan Loc and began our long distance flight. Since I knew it wasn't going to be a hunter killer kind of mission, I brought a cassette player with me and recorded many parts of the flight.

We flew east to Phan Thiet where the coastline of Vietnam and the South China Sea met and then proceeded Northward for hour after hour. I remember seeing the "Phang Rang Pass" for the first time and recalled the many stories I'd heard about the battles that had taken place all over that area.

An Island that was just offshore had been the site of a huge battle between the Viet Cong and the Korean soldiers we had as our ally. It was famous to us as it was the first experience we had in learning about the "ears" that they had attached to their belts as proof of how many VC they had killed in combat.

It seemed that proof of killing had with it some kind of bonus for their infantry and one guy had ears hanging from his belt to the ground. They were tough as nails and showed no mercy when fighting the merciless and murderous Viet Cong.

Just as we prepared to stop for fuel we received a radio call warning us that we were flying through an artillery line where 125 or 155 mm Howitzers or 8" guns from offshore Navy cruisers were flying through the air.

It reminded me of my first combat mission with Wollman where he found a spot where we would be clear of the artillery lines and more or less, stopped the aircraft and brought it to a hover over the battle field. I can close my eyes and re run all of that through my memory. You may recall that I mentioned that it "wasn't in the tactics book" I had just finished studying at Ft. Rucker, and then, I realized that guys like Wollman were the ones that were writing the book.

I remember how beautiful Chamron Bay was (SP). I'd read about the U.S. Marine Corp coming ashore in amphibious assault boats there and imagined what that might have been like. In any event, we finally arrived at Tuy Hoa and said our goodbyes to Major Lewis. One hell of a good commander.

After refueling for the second time, we took off and headed south as we knew it was going to be an all day long flight that might well end up with us having a night landing if we didn't get a move on.

Nothing of any importance happened on the flight back to Long Binh except for the fact that I had experienced a number of "hot refuels" where we never shut down the helicopter's turbine. When we finally made it home, I remember filling out the log book and being surprised that we had booked nine or eleven hours of flight time that day. It was the most hours I had ever logged or would ever log in one day.   

  

Thursday, April 26, 2012

Correction for post below

McGeorge Bundy was the head of covert operations under Kennedy. Thanks.

Assassination Attempt targeting Bob Hope 1964


I hate to get "Off Topic" again but sometimes, you have to do that. Despite the fact that it takes me away from the "flow" of my memories of the combat missions I flew in Vietnam, today's circumstances require that I do so. Please bare with me and know that I will get back to the remainder of my stories from the days when I flew with the 199th Light Infantry Brigade.

As it specifically relates to the reason that I am off topic, know that I belong to a number of military organizations that have web sites where daily communications take place. Day before yesterday, one of them had an Editorial regarding Bob Hope and his incredible record of entertaining troops during his entire career. I wanted to post a reply to that Editorial but there are rules on that site that absolutely, positively forbid "Politicizing" the site.

In view of that, I wanted to respect the rules and respond to that Editorial here because my blog has a link there and they can read my response without any violations of the rules. For those of you who do not like or offended by political history, please disconnect now and do not read further.

As it relates to all of that and to substantiate the source documents, be advised that I read "A Soldier Reports" which is a book written by General Westmorland. I also read "LBJ" which is a book written from the reports of 400 of his staffers. During those reads, I learned alot of things including the content of messages sent from the LBJ White House and Macv Headquarters.

One of the things I learned had to do with an assassination attempt targeting Bob Hope. I lost the books and a number of other things during a tornado and will attempt to do this from memory only, and can not give you a chapter and verse of who said what or the exact day that each of the following events took place. Again, this is from memory only.

Despite not having those source documents at hand, sometime after the farce known as the "1964 Gulf of Tonkin Incident"of August 1964, Bob Hope was in Vietnam to entertain the troops. That was most probably in December of 64. While he was there, he was in the Brink's Hotel in Saigon. During that time, the Viet Cong decided to assassinate him. Fortunately for all of us, the attempt failed.

Around that time, McGeorge Bundy had a meeting with the General Grade Officers at Macv in Saigon. I think that McGeorge Bundy was the Secretary of State but he might have been the Secretary of Defense, I just can't remember. Regardless of his station in the government, he was the highest ranking representative of the Johnson White House in Vietnam during that meeting.

General Westmorland reported that Bundy went nuts when he found out about the assassination attempt. Westmorland, as he witnessed Bundy's reaction to the news, described him as the "Most Hitlerian Individual He'd Ever Met". Shortly thereafter, if you will recall, Bundy contacted the LBJ White House and the results ended up with an order to "call up the Reserves". That resulted in a troop concentration in Vietnam that went from 16,000 to a quarter of a million men.

It's real important to note that President Ky or Thieu, ordered an air strike against North Vietnam 48 hours prior to the fabrication of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. It is also important to know that the assassination attempt took place roughly 4 months later.

I would suggest that any of you who are that interested in the step by step events that took place during the early years of the Vietnam War, get the two books mentioned above and connect the dots yourself. It certainly opened my eyes and explained many of the orders we had, that to me, didn't make any sense at all.

Above all, please understand that I do not access any situation above and the resulting troop escalations, to be the fault of Bob Hope. I actually had the honor of flying low level recon missions around Long Binh when he came for Christmas in 1970. My specific orders were "shoot to kill" anybody carrying an AK 47 or wearing an NVA pith helmet. Nobody worth shooting showed up

Please excuse any misquoted dates.








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Tuesday, April 24, 2012

This one has Wollman's name all over it.

Wollman wasn't a teacher, he was an educator and there is one hell of a difference between the two. On the night that the Lt. Col came to meet with our CO, the weather at FSB Mace was okay. Despite that, as we were attempting our taxi flight to return the LC back to Long Binh, I discovered what a night monsoon mission was like.

Once we were airborne remember seeing the monster just west of Xuan Loc, close to Long Binh and was amazed at the size and scope of the monsoon every time the lightning lit up the sky and gave us a visual picture of what we were flying toward. I'm not sure if Wollman was testing me or teaching me but as soon as the lightning hit and the picture of our immediate future became clear, he said: "Contact Center and get us a vector out of here".

I looked up the frequency, dialed in the numbers and immediately heard the non stop radio traffic from every aircraft in that part of South Vietnam that was trying to escape the storm. Finally, I found a break and made my call: "Center, this is Fireball 558". They responded and I requested a vector to any station that was still VFR. They asked us to tune our transponder to 1200 and "ident". We did that and as soon as we did, we heard: "Roger, Fireball 558, contact 6 clicks west of Xuan Loc, turn left to a heading of 180 degrees and proceed south. Bear Cat is open". I responded with my own "Roger, Fireball 558" and turned south.

I don't remember how long it would take to fly to Bear Cat as I had never been there and simply didn't know. As we continued to fly along, the non stop radio calls to Center were beginning to indicate that there were lots and lots of fixed wing and rotary wing pilots trying to escape the monsoon. Center called and advised us to contact Bear Cat Approach Control, gave us the frequency and signed off.

Bear Cat Approach Control was overflowing with radio calls but I found a break and made my contact with them. As soon as I did that, they asked us to make a right turn for separation, a normal request to keep traffic from piling up and causing a mid air collision. As soon as I completed my 360 degree clearing turn, they called us and said: "Fireball 558, state final approach speed". This was the first of 3 or 4 calls they made to us to confirm our final approach speed. I told them 120 knots and they asked us to slow to 100 knots and make another 360 degree clearing turn to the right.

We finally reached a point where we could see the lights from Bear Cat but we noticed that there were so many airborne lights from helicopters and fixed wing aircraft trying to land, we became a bit concerned as we were running very low on fuel. The airspace around and above Bear Cat looked like some kind of Christmas show. I don't have any idea how many aircraft were seeking shelter from the monsoon but I knew it was the most I had ever seen at one spot, at one time.

With yet another request for a clearing turn and a slower approach speed, I guess I lost my patience. I remember responding with something to the effect that "If you will let us intersect the Locator Outer Marker, I will stop completely and hover down to tree top level and give you all the clearance you need".

I don't know if Wollman was testing me for a possible aircraft commander check ride, or to simply see how I would handle that kind of situation. Regardless of any reason, he had me make all the radio calls and do all the flying and even though it was a shitty situation, he seemed as calm as a guy taking his favorite girl for a nice, easy flight during night time. I would later learn that he was just as calm during the longest Nighthawk Mission he and I ever flew together. We could have called him Ice Man because he was just that brave or just that calm under real tight situations.

In any event, the pucker factor went up right after I made my last clearing turn for separation. Of all things, the 20 minute fuel warning light came on. We were only a couple of minutes away from the airfield but Wollman made one of those decisions that only an aircraft commander can make. He turned his radio switch to transmit and informed approach control that we had a 20 minute fuel warning light on and he WAS coming "straight in".

There was no doubt about his intention and with the inflection of his voice, I'm sure that every airplane in the circuit understood that he didn't really give a shit who was first, who was fastest or any separation issues that might continue to exist. Needless to say, we made a straight in approach and hovered directly to the refueling area with the bright yellow 20 minute fuel warning light blaring from the cockpit as it had been doing for way too many minutes.

We made a successful landing, fueled up and hovered to a revetment area where we shut down the helicopter. May not sound like much of a war story but again, there are all sorts of battles that helicopter pilots had during the war and many of them were just like this one when the monsoons came. Thanks to Wollman for being such a great aircraft commander and having the guts to give total control of the Huey to a copilot to see how he could handle those kinds of situations. Without a doubt, those lessons served me well during many Nighthawk Missions I later flew with the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Thanks to Craig Wollman, the pilot I consider to be the best night combat ops pilot I ever flew with.  


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Wednesday, April 18, 2012

"Take it, take it, I have Vertigo"

One night that was filled with bad weather, Terry Femmer and I took off from Fire Support Base Mace and attempted to make the flight back to Long Binh. The weather wasn't rainy or anything like that but typically, after an unusually heavy rain from the monsoons, with the temperature reaching over 100 degrees during the day, we would suffer from the fog that always comes after a weather condition like that.

If there ever was a day when Diable's repeated "Attention to Detail" mantra hit home, this was it.

I don't remember who the gunner was but I most clearly remember that the crew chief was Spec 4 Moses Richardson from Indianapolis. Mose use to say that he was the Black Mose from Nap Town and he was one cool crew chief that made his value to us known on many occasions. I'll have to get into that later but suffice it to say he considered us to be his Blue Eyed Soul Brothers. I've lost contact with him and even the net hasn't  helped find him.

In any event, if I haven't explained it before, FSB Mace was located at the foot of a mountain that was just east of Xuan Loc, an area that has it's place in history as one of the most hotly contested areas in our Area of Operations. The FSB had a helipad area there that even had lights for us to see during inclement weather conditions. They were seldom on but when we needed them, there they were helping us find our way through the weather to a safe landing after a night mission.

When Femmer took off, we were heading east. Almost immediately after take off, he made a right hand climbing turn to gain the altitude we needed to clear the mountain. It seems that no sooner than we picked up a westerly heading, Femmer came on the intercom and said: "Take it, take it, I have vertigo".

Having made a couple of  IFR flights with Wollman, I was pretty comfortable in that environment and had already settled down to the instrument scans that any decent co pilot would do for his Aircraft Commander. At the time Femmer told me to take the controls, I still had, through my peripheral vision, a good sight picture of the helipad with it's landing lights on.

Almost immediately after Femmer's comment for me to take it, I heard Mose over the intercom. He said: "Please, one of you guys do some of that pilot stuff". I had already grabbed the controls of the Huey and began a shallow bank to the right away from the mountain and, at the same time I said: "Guys, I have the helipad still in sight and I'm making a right base to final approach back to the pad, don't worry, I've got it in sight". 

I told Femmer to put his feet on the floor and shake it off and not to worry that I was VFR which was our term for visual flight rules that allowed me to see exactly where I intended to land and the attitude of the helicopter. I just wanted everybody to know that the aircraft was under control and we would be back on the ground in about one minute.

That may not seem like much of a war story for you but I assure you that the monsoon season brought on some really tough flying conditions and I'm sure that we lost many aircraft due to those incredibly difficult flying situations.

More to come later. I'm feeling a little better now. I have another Wollman story coming so please stand by. I'm still a bit fatigued from all the meltdowns and the lower back pain that always comes from the kidneys when dye is injected into your body during a Catscan.

Rest in Peace, Terry Femmer. A great Aircraft Commander and true patriot.